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Associational Speech
ABSTRACT. This Article explores the relationship between the First Amendment right of free
speech and the nontextual First Amendment right of freedom of association. The Article
provides important and new insights into this area of law, drawing upon recent scholarship to
urge a substantial rethinking of the Supreme Court's approach to this subject. The Article
proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the doctrinal roots of the right of association and reviews
recent scholarship regarding the association right, as well as the provisions of the First
Amendment addressing public assembly and petitioning the government for a redress of
grievances. Drawing on these materials, I demonstrate that the assembly, petition, and
association rights historically were important, independent rights of coequal status to the free
speech and press rights of the First Amendment, and therefore that the Supreme Court's modern
tendency to treat the association right as subordinate to speech is incorrect. Building upon this
conclusion, I then advance the novel argument that the key First Amendment rights of speech,
assembly, petition, and association should be perceived as interrelated and mutually reinforcing
mechanisms designed to advance democratic self-government. In particular, I argue that one of
the key functions of free speech in our system is to facilitate the exercise of other First
Amendment rights, including notably the right of association. I describe this as the theory of
associational speech. Part II explores the implications of the theory of associational speech for
various areas of free speech doctrine, including incitement, hostile audiences, and the public
forum doctrine. Finally, Part III explores some broader questions regarding what the theory of
associational speech teaches us about the basic nature of free speech and about the
interrelationships between the various provisions of the First Amendment. It also notes some
limits of the associational speech concept.
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In traditional legal thinking, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
has been ineluctably, and almost exclusively, tied to freedom of speech. On
occasion, mention might also be made of the Press Clause of the First
Amendment or of the two Religion Clauses; but free speech has been the
central focus of First Amendment law and scholarship. In fact, however, the
text of the First Amendment is not limited to, or even particularly focused on,
speech. The full text of the Amendment reads as follows: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."'
Freedom of speech is no doubt mentioned, but it is given no particular
prominence and is sandwiched in between other, distinct topics. In particular,
the First Amendment mentions not only freedom of speech, of the press, and
of religion but also freedom of assembly and the right to petition the
government. In addition, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the First
Amendment to protect an implicit right of association.' These last provisions
have traditionally been the poor stepchildren of First Amendment law,
neglected and ignored.
In the past several years, that tradition of neglect has ended, and we have
witnessed an explosion of scholarship on those other aspects of the First
Amendment, notably on the rights of association and assembly.' These
developments appear to have been triggered in part by the general advance of
communitarian and civic republican models of democracy in the academy and
in part by the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,
holding that the First Amendment's right of association protected the Boy
Scouts' decision to expel a gay assistant scoutmaster, in violation of state
antidiscrimination law.4 Regardless of its cause, this scholarship has thrown
important new light on the significance of these forgotten liberties and their
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); MARK E. WARREN,
DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION (2001); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right ofAssembly,
56 UCLA L. REv. 543 (2009); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L.
REv. 565 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, Forgotten Freedom]; John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of
the Constitutional Right ofAssociation, 77 TENN. L. REv. 485 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, Strange
Origins]; Jason Mazzone, Freedom'sAssociations, 77 WASH. L. REv. 639 (2002).
4. Dale, 530 U.S. 640; see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The
Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000); Symposium, The Freedom of Expressive




relationship to the better-known provisions of the First Amendment, notably
the Free Speech Clause. Most importantly, this scholarship convincingly
demonstrates that the textual assembly and petition rights in the First
Amendment were historically at least as significant as, and indeed antecedent
to, the free speech right. It also strongly suggests that the nontextual
association right is best understood as a significant and distinct right, tied to
the Assembly Clause and not (as the modern Supreme Court has suggested)
derivative of the free speech guarantee.
This Article seeks to take these insights one step further. It proposes that
even today, assembly, petition, and association are at least as central to the
process of self-governance as is free speech and that assembly and petition were
historically viewed as more fundamental to a politically functional society than
speech. On the assumption that ensuring self-governance is the primary
structural purpose of the First Amendment, this argument suggests that the
freedom of association (along with assembly and petition) is not merely
derivative of the freedom of speech. Instead, the freedom of association
deserves at least equal stature in its own right-and in some contexts enjoys
primacy over the freedom of speech. Furthermore, this Article argues that one
of the most important functions of free speech in our society, and in
constitutional law, is to advance and protect the right of association, rather
than purely the converse as the Supreme Court has suggested in recent years.s I
call this form of speech "associational." Associational speech is speech that is
meant to induce others to associate with the speaker, to strengthen existing
associational bonds among individuals including the speaker, or to
communicate an association's views to outsiders (including government
officials). Such speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment's structural
goals and plays a central role in many First Amendment controversies.
Understanding the speech at issue in those situations in associational terms
provides insight beyond that of traditional theory and doctrine because it helps
explain why the courts have singled out certain specific forms of speech for
particularly stringent constitutional protection. The purpose of this Article is to
explain and defend this thesis and to explore its implications for free speech
doctrine in a number of different areas.
The thesis propounded here neither claims to be an originalist account (if
that is possible with respect to the First Amendment) nor presents
associational speech as a grand theory explaining all facets of free speech law.
Not all speech is associational, at least in a meaningful sense. Scientific talks
5. See infra notes 24-55 and accompanying text (discussing, among other cases, NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, and Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale).
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and papers, mass media publications and broadcasts, commercial advertising,
and published literature, for example, all have little or no associational element
to them, yet are all clearly protected by the First Amendment.6 Nonetheless,
the concept of associational speech is important for several reasons. Most
importantly, understanding the associational role of speech leads to a deeper
understanding of the broad, structural functions of the First Amendment and,
in particular, of how distinct provisions of the First Amendment interact to
perform those structural functions. In addition, as the discussion in Part II
demonstrates, the associational perspective gives important clarity to some very
important areas of First Amendment law, helping to explain distinctions that
the Supreme Court has drawn in the area of free speech that are not otherwise
easily explicable.
Part I explores the development of the implicit right of association and the
evolving relationship of that right with the free speech and assembly rights. It
also discusses the relationship of assembly, petition, and association to self-
governance and the modern scholarship on the historical roots of these rights.
Part I then uses these insights to develop a theory of associational speech. Next,
Part II explores the implications of this theory for various areas of free speech
law. Finally, Part III explores some broader questions about what the theory of
associational speech teaches us about the basic nature of free speech, as well as
some of the limits to the concept of the associational speech.
I. ASSOCIATION AND SPEECH-A CONVOLUTED RELATIONSHIP
To understand the relationship among free speech, association, and
assembly, some background is necessary. To that end, this Part traces the
doctrinal evolution of the First Amendment rights of association and assembly
over the past century, as well as the historical roots and functions of those
rights and the closely related right of petition. To begin with a clarification, the
Supreme Court has over the years used the terms "association" and "assembly"
interchangeably (even though assembly is mentioned in the constitutional text
and association is not). Generally, however, the scholarship suggests that
assembly was understood historically to refer to ad hoc gatherings of citizens,
while association was understood to refer to more permanent citizen
6. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (mass media
broadcasts); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991) (published literature); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial advertising); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.




organizations, whether formally constituted or not.' How those rights came to
be recognized and enforced in the Supreme Court is a complex tale, to which
we now turn.
A. Association and Assembly in the Supreme Court
For the first 125 years of its history, the Free Speech Clause was essentially
absent from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The reasons for this absence
are many: first, prior to incorporation, most free speech controversies raised nofederal constitutional issues, since state governments were the primary
regulatory authorities; second, the Alien and Sedition Act controversy never
reached the Supreme Court; and third, the Court itself took a notably narrow
8
view of the scope of the Free Speech Clause. Assembly and association cases
were similarly absent from the Court prior to the twentieth century. The
evolution of the assembly and associational rights in the Court began a few
years after the birth of free speech jurisprudence in the 1919 Espionage Act
cases,9 with the Court's famous decision in Whitney v. California.'o
Whitney is generally cited as a free speech case; indeed, it is remembered as
one of the classic triumvirate of free speech cases in which Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, in separate opinions, formulated their "clear and present danger" test
and developed their underlying theories of free speech." Justice Brandeis's
concurring opinion in Whitney famously expounded his self-governance
rationale for protecting speech and has been described as perhaps the most
important free speech opinion in the Supreme Court's history." All of this is a
bit odd, however, because Whitney was not a free speech case at all. It was a
case about association and assembly. The case arose from the prosecution for
criminal syndicalism of Anita Whitney, a leading California left-wing activist
7. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att'y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (suggesting that
the "main purpose" of the First Amendment was to prohibit prior restraints on speech).
9. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
10. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
11. The other two cases are Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); and Abrais v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
12. See generally Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw STORIES 383 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing the
influence of Justice Brandeis's Whitney opinion on subsequent First Amendment case law
and scholarship).
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(and niece of Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field). The crux of the
prosecution, however, was not that Whitney's speech constituted criminal
syndicalism (which California law defined as the advocacy of crimes or violence
to effect change in industrial ownership) but merely that she belonged to an
organization, the Communist Labor Party, that engaged in syndicalism. Speech
could not have been a basis for the prosecution because Whitney herself had
never advocated violence; to the contrary, she was on the record as supporting
peaceful, democratic activism." Furthermore, both the majority opinion
(affirming Whitney's conviction) and Justice Brandeis's separate opinion seem
to have recognized this point, at least implicitly. While both opinions
mentioned free speech, they did not limit themselves to it. The majority
described the rights at issue as "rights of free speech, assembly, and
association,"" while Justice Brandeis repeatedly described the relevant
constitutional provisions as the rights of free speech and assembly."
There are two important lessons to be learned from Whitney: first, that as
of 1927, members of the Court were treating the rights of free speech,
assembly, and association as distinct but coequal (albeit to dismiss them all, in
the case of the majority); and second, that no clear distinctions were being
drawn at this time between association and assembly. The majority spoke of
both rights in the same breath, without clarifying the distinction between
them, while Justice Brandeis spoke exclusively of assembly, apparently without
thinking his nomenclature had any significance. In his view, as well as in the
majority's view, the textual right of assembly protected membership in political
organizations.
In the years following Whitney, the Court continued to recognize and
enforce rights of assembly and association, without clearly distinguishing
between the two. In 1937, the Court held in Defonge v. Oregon'6 that convicting
an individual for attending a lawful meeting merely because the meeting was
held under the auspices of the Communist Party violated the right of peaceable
assembly. The Court described the right of assembly as "cognate to those of
free speech and free press and . . . equally fundamental."" Similarly, in 1945,
the Court in Thomas v. Collins'8 reversed the conviction of a union organizer
who gave a speech to an assemblage of workers in violation of a state statute
13. Id. at 387-88.
14. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371.
is. Id. at 372-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
16. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
17. Id. at 364.




and judicial order requiring him to obtain a permit. The Court held that the
statutory scheme constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on the official's
rights of free speech and assembly, 9 and the Court again described speech,
press, assembly, and (this time) petition as cognate rights that in combination
constitute "the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment."2 o In 1950, on the other hand, the Court in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds upheld a federal statute that, in effect, required
union officials to disclaim membership in or support for the Communist
Party." At various points, the Court's opinion described the statute as
impinging on rights of free speech and assembly," though at one point it
referenced "freedom of association" instead," again without drawing any
distinction. Note that Douds primarily involved not speech but membership in
the Communist Party, demonstrating that the Court continued to view
assembly and association as interchangeable and as protecting membership in
permanent organizations.
The next step in this area, and the key one from the point of view of
modern law, was the Court's 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson.' In that case, the Court held that an Alabama law requiring the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to
disclose its membership lists violated what the NAACP members described as
their First Amendment right of "lawful association in support of their common
beliefs." In the course of its discussion, the Court freely cited cases involving
freedom of assembly, such as De Jonge and Thomas, 6 and at various points
used the terms association and assembly interchangeably, though its emphasis
was clearly on association rather than assembly. 7 What is noteworthy,
however, is that the NAACP v. Alabama Court discussed the rights of
association and assembly not as independent, cognate rights, but rather as
means to enable free speech. Thus, the Court stated: "Effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
19. Id. at 518.
20. Id. at 530.
21. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
22. See id. at 399-402.
23. Id. at 409.
24. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
25. Id. at 460. The context of the case was the civil rights movement and the efforts of Southern
state governments to resist desegregation.
26. Id.
27. E.g., id. at 462.
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undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once
recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembly."12 On this view, membership in organizations was protected no
longer as an independent political freedom but as an aspect of free speech. And
something had been lost in the translation.
In later cases, the Court largely followed its new approach, emphasizing
association, not assembly, as the relevant right and treating association as
subsidiary to free speech. In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court struck down an
Arkansas statute requiring public school teachers to reveal their membership in
organizations, finding that the statute burdened teachers' "right of free
association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech."2 In NAACP v. Button,
the Court struck down a Virginia statute that in effect prohibited organizations
such as the NAACP from providing lawyers to represent civil rights plaintiffs
when the organization itself was not involved in the litigation.3o The right at
issue, the Court wrote, was the right "to associate for the purpose of assisting
persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally
guaranteed and other rights."" The Court also, oddly, described NAACP-
supported litigation as "a form of political expression,"3 2 and it treated the
association right as nontextual and independent of assembly." That the Court
struggled to apply a free speech lens" in NAACP v. Button-a case that
centered on litigation, a form of activity otherwise considered a form of
petitioning" -demonstrates the extent to which the Court had lost sight of the
vision of the speech, press, assembly, and petition protections as independent
and equal forms of political freedom. Later cases from the 1970s - such as Healy
v. James, involving the registration of student organizations on a state college
28. Id. at 46o.
29. 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); see id. at 480, 490.
30. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
31. Id. at 428.
32. Id. at 429.
33. See id. at 430.
34. Admittedly, the Court did at one point mention the petition right as well, id., but in a
decidedly off-hand fashion.




campus,6 and Kusper v. Pontikes, involving the rights of individuals to shift
political party affiliation between elections-7 _ continued to follow this pattern.
The key modern developments in the area of association began with the
Court's landmark 1984 decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees."' The
question in the case was whether the United States Jaycees, a national
membership organization dedicated to advancing the interests of young men,
had a First Amendment right to restrict its membership to men, in the face of
state antidiscrimination laws that required the admission of women. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion began its analysis by distinguishing between a
right of intimate association, rooted in the Court's privacy jurisprudence, " and
a First Amendment right of association for the purposes of engaging in
activities protected by the First Amendment. 4o The Court then rejected the
Jaycees' claims on both fronts. With respect to intimate association, the Court
held that the Jaycees, with a national membership of 295,000, simply did not
constitute an intimate association.4 1  Its analysis of First Amendment
association, however, was more complex. The Court acknowledged that
requiring the Jaycees to admit members against its will was a clear and direct
intrusion into the association's freedom.42 Ultimately, however, the Court
concluded that because of the state's compelling interest in eliminating gender
discrimination, 43 and (critically) because admission of women would not
significantly interfere with the Jaycees' "freedom of expressive association"4-
that is, the organization's ability to "engage in . . . protected activities or to
36. 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) ("While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the
Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and
petition.").
37. 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) ("There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with
others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group
activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
38. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
39. Id. at 617-18. The privacy jurisprudence is a reference to cases protecting nontextual rights,
such as the right to marry, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); the right to
cohabitate with one's family members, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); and the right to control one's children's upbringing, see Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Note that at this point of its analysis, the Court linked the First Amendment association
right not to speech alone but also to such other First Amendment activities as assembly and
petitioning. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
41. Id. at 613, 621-22.
42. Id. at 623.
43. Id. at 623-26.
44. Id. at 626.
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disseminate its preferred views"41-no constitutional violation had occurred.46
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion agreeing with the result but arguing
that the majority underprotected associational rights. Her view was that the
law should distinguish between commercial associations, which enjoy limited
constitutional protection, and associations that engage predominantly in
"protected expression," to which she would have accorded essentially complete
freedom to select their members. 7 Interestingly, however, she defined the
phrase "protected expression" very broadly, to include not only "expressive
words" and "strident" conduct but also "quiet persuasion, inculcation of
traditional values, instruction of the young, and community service."48
In the years following Roberts, the Court decided two other cases applying
the holding of that case. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte,49 the Court upheld a state law requiring local Rotary Clubs to
admit women, and in New York State Club Ass'n v. City ofNew York,so the Court
upheld a local ordinance requiring large eating clubs (with more than four
hundred members) to admit women. In the latter case, Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to reiterate her view that truly expressive associations possess a First
Amendment right to select their members." Following the reasoning of Roberts
in both cases, the Court relied on the state's strong interest in controlling
discrimination and on the fact that the associations involved did not engage in
much expressive activity, so that the forced admission of women would not
interfere with free expression.52 These cases demonstrate a critical change to
the Court's association jurisprudence in the wake of Roberts. In the early
association cases, the Court emphasized the link between association and free
expression as a means to strengthen the right of association, driven in part by
the Court's (unwarranted) concerns that the right otherwise lacked
constitutional mooring. In Roberts and its progeny, however, the Court
invoked the connection with free speech to restrict the right by rejecting
constitutional protection for associations that are not predominantly
expressive. With this move, the Court abandoned its original insight that
45. Id. at 627.
46. Id. at 628-29.
47. Id. at 632-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
48. Id. at 6;6.
49- 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
50. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
51. Id. at 18-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




association and assembly, while linked to free speech and press, are cognate,
independent rights.
The most recent turn in the Court's modern association jurisprudence
occurred in the 2000 case of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.s" The case arose
when the Boy Scouts revoked James Dale's adult membership and position as
an assistant scoutmaster upon learning that Dale was homosexual and a gay
rights activist. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts'
actions violated New Jersey's law banning discrimination in places of public
accommodation, and the question posed to the Court was whether New
Jersey's application of its antidiscrimination law in this context violated the
First Amendment. The Court began in much the same way as in Roberts by
confirming that, to come within the right of expressive association, "a group
must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private," and
that the right was infringed if forced inclusion of a member "affects in a
significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.""
Unlike in Roberts, however, a majority of the Court in Dale found a
constitutional violation, in that forcing the Boy Scouts to include Dale as a
member would impair the Scouts' ability to express a message of hostility to
homosexual conduct. (Interestingly, the Court deferred to the Boy Scouts'
assertions that the organization was in fact hostile to homosexuality and that
Dale's inclusion would interfere with its ability to convey that message.")
Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent, joined by three other Justices,
contesting both key assumptions of the majority: that the Boy Scouts in fact
did disapprove of homosexuality and that Dale's inclusion would interfere with
their expression." Dale thus demonstrated that while the Roberts Court's
reformulation of associational rights did not spell the end of those rights, no
member of the Court was inclined to question the reformulation itself.
B. Association, Assembly, Petitioning, and Self-Governance
This description of the evolution of the Court's association jurisprudence
indicates that, in the seventy-three years between Whitney and Dale, something
went astray in the Court's understanding of the association right. Recent
scholarship tends to confirm this view, as does consideration of more
foundational principles.
53- 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
54. Id. at 648.
ss. Id. at 65o-3.
56. Id. at 663-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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As noted earlier, recent years have seen an explosion in scholarship
regarding association and assembly. Leaving aside the extensive scholarship
discussing the merits and (usually) demerits of the Dale decision, a topic that is
not the main subject of this Article, the scholarship has two major components.
First, in the fields of political science and philosophy, there has arisen a vibrant
scholarship discussing the role that civic associations play in American political
and social life, both historically and in modern America. Prominent recent
examples of works in this area include Amy Gutmann's edited collection
Freedom of Association,7 Nancy Rosenblum's Membership and Morals," and
Mark Warren's Democracy and Association." The second branch of scholarship,
on which this Article focuses, constitutes legal scholarship examining the
historical origins of the assembly and association rights .o
Several points emerge from this scholarship. Most importantly, the
scholarship confirms the close, historical links between assembly and
association. Both were seen as forums in which citizens could engage in the
process of self-governance, with the difference being that assemblies were
probably understood as ad hoc groups gathered in public or private while
associations constituted more permanent groupings of citizens, meeting either
publicly or in private.6' Thus, the early Supreme Court's tendency to conflate
these concepts is understandable, and the modern Court's failure to recognize
the relationship between association and assembly is significant. Admittedly, as
Jason Mazzone points out, there is some ambiguity about whether the
assembly and petition clauses were understood by (some of) the Framing
generation to protect permanent associations; 62 but the deep historical roots
and significance of associations to American democracy are clear. The
scholarship also confirms what the textual juxtaposition suggests: that
assembly and petition are closely linked rights, again with deep historical roots.
Mazzone goes so far as to argue that the Assembly Clause protects only
57. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 3.
58. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN
AMERICA (1998).
59. WARREN, supra note 3.
6o. See, e.g., Abu El-FLaj, supra note 3; Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 3; Inazu, Strange
Origins, supra note 3; Mazzone, supra note 3.
6i. Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 3, at 491 (citing Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., The Open
Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry into Freedom of Association, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 336
(1947)); id. at slo-u1 (citing LEO PFEFFER, THE LIBERTIES OF AN AMERICAN: THE SUPREME
COURT SPEAKS 97-123 (1956)).




assembly for petitioning purposes." John Inazu has convincingly refuted this
narrow reading but confirms the historical link between the two activities.64
More importantly, Inazu and Mazzone confirm that, historically, assembly and
association were essential components of political activism, from the
precolonial period through the American Revolution and the nineteenth
century."6
The tie between the rights of assembly and association on the one hand and
of petition on the other also clarifies their deep, historical roots -roots that are
much deeper, in fact, than those of free speech. A right to petition the
government in England appeared at least as early as the thirteenth century and,
unlike free speech and assembly, was explicitly protected by the English Bill of
Rights of 1689.66 Jason Mazzone also points out that in the English tradition,
the link between petitioning and association became significant as early as the
seventeenth century, as the practice of group or "common" petitioning became
linked to the formation of private associations created for the purpose of
petitioning.6' This was during an era when the law of seditious libel and the
practice of licensing meant that political speech was restricted and enjoyed far
less protection than petitioning (notably because petitions were immune from
criminal libel prosecutions).
Finally, the scholarship clearly demonstrates that the Framing generation
was fully aware of the importance of assembly and petitioning in a system of
democratic government, as opposed to the system from which the Framers had
broken. What history we have of the drafting of the Assembly and Petition
Clauses indicates that the First Congress, in drafting the Bill of Rights, was
fully cognizant of the significance of public assembly and of the close
relationship among assembly, free speech, and self-governance.69 Nor should
63. Id. at 712-13.
64. Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 3, at 573-77.
65. Id. at 575-88 (recounting numerous historical episodes of association and assembly, from the
arrest of William Penn to the Democratic-Republican Societies of the 1790s to the
abolitionist and suffrage movements); Mazzone, supra note 3, at 642-44, 700-01 (recounting
the role of women's clubs during the nineteenth century in engaging women in political
participation); id. at 730-34 (describing the roles of public assembly and of Revolutionary
associations in the American Revolution); see also Abu El-Haj, supra note 3, at 555-61
(recounting similar historical episodes).
66. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 1239, 1299-1300 (2008); Mazzone, supra note 3, at 720.
67. Mazzone, supra note 3, at 722-23.
68. Id. at 721-22.
69. Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 3, at 571-77.
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this awareness be a surprise. The generation that drafted the First Amendment
had lived through the Revolutionary era and surely understood the importance
of association and assembly in creating a popular revolution. They understood
that the rights of speech, press, assembly, association, and petition are all at
heart political freedoms that are essential to democratic self-governance. Nor
was this awareness limited to the Framing era. In particular, the
Reconstruction-era authors of the Fourteenth Amendment were also surely
aware of the central importance of these freedoms, especially assembly and
association, in the political and economic empowerment of newly emancipated
slaves. The Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as a reaction, at least
in part, to the evisceration of those liberties by Southern states prior to the
Civil War and in the "Black Codes" adopted in the wake of the war.7o
The passage of time has not reduced the significance of this insight for
American democracy. Indeed, despite their English roots, assembly and
association have evolved as distinctly American phenomena. In a passage
repeatedly quoted by association scholars, Tocqueville commented on the
significance of associations to American democracy. "Americans of all ages, all
stations of life, and all types of disposition," he said, "are forever forming
associations." 7' As Mark Warren points out, Tocqueville saw associations as
contributing to democracy in two ways: by permitting organization and
resistance to the state and by developing the habits, skills, and values that make
collective rule possible.7 ' Tabatha Abu El-Haj similarly points out that
assembly historically has been a central component of citizen participation in
self-government, not only or even primarily to facilitate free speech, 7  and
70. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1280 (1992); Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment: Recalling What the Court
Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 991 & n.369 (2008); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q_.421, 446; Inazu,
Forgotten Freedom, supra note 3, at 582-84.
71. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1840). For examples of quotations from this passage, see Amy
Gutmann, Freedom ofAssociation: An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra
note 3, at 3; and Mazzone, supra note 3, at 688.
72. WARREN, supra note 3, at 29-30. For an insightful discussion of the relationship between
association and value-formation, which does not draw a connection to self-governance, see
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 839, 840-41, 865-69 (2005).
73. Abu El-Haj, supra note 3, at 547, 554-55, 586-89 (discussing the relationship between





Mazzone makes similar arguments.74 Nor has the Supreme Court ignored this
relationship. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court pointed out that "[o]ur
form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the
right to engage in political expression and association" and that the exercise of
"basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of
political associations."" In NAACP v. Button, the Court quoted from this
language to support its protection of the NAACP's right to associate for the
purposes of litigation, though not for speech.76
From a historical perspective, moreover, the long-standing appreciation of
the importance of assembly and association to self-governance makes good
sense. During the early Republic, large numbers of citizens lacked the
franchise - and in any event, voting in occasional elections is a passive and
inadequate form of citizen participation in government.'7 Then, as now, the
power of individuals to communicate their views widely, or to influence public
officials, was very limited (especially in an era of limited communications).
Meaningful participation in government aside from voting (which was open
only to some) required citizens to act together. Sometimes, that joint action
took the form of public assemblies, designed to develop common values and to
catch the attention of those in power. Other times, it may have been through
associations of the sort discussed by Tocqueville. But either way, group action
was and is an essential aspect of meaningful self-governance.
Finally, this understanding of assembly and association as critical to self-
governance fits well with general First Amendment theories. Over time, three
distinct theories of free speech have gained prominence and acceptance.' One,
based on the writings of John Stuart Mill' 9 and on Justice Holmes's famous
dissent in Abrams v. United States,o suggests that the purpose of free speech is
to ensure that the truth shall emerge in the marketplace of ideas. Another,
74. Mazzone, supra note 3, at 647, 729-30.
75. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
76. 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
77. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(discussing historical limits on the franchise); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People:
Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=1670134 (discussing historical forms of political
participation aside from voting).
78. For a general discussion, see ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES
AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 79-81 (2010).
79. JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 20-22 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1998) (1859).
so. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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prominently defended by Edwin Baker and Thomas Emerson, is that free
speech's importance lies in its value to individuals as they seek self-
fulfillment.' It is fair to say, however, that in recent decades the most
prominent and widely accepted theory of free speech is the third, which
emphasizes its role in self-governance. As noted earlier, this theory was first
explicated in the Supreme Court by Justice Brandeis's opinion in Whitney." It
was later carefully formulated and defended by the philosopher Alexander
Meiklejohn" and has since been espoused by legal scholars as influential and
diverse as Robert Bork81 and Cass Sunstein.8s The essence of this theory is that
the primary constitutional significance of free speech is its contribution to
political debate and thus its enablement of democratic self-governance.
Without speech, democracy would be impossible because citizens would have
no way to discuss and form their views, including their views about the
conduct and competence of public officials.
In the literature, self-governance has been advanced as a theory of free
speech. In fact, however, as the prior discussion indicates, it is better
understood as a theory of the First Amendment generally or at least of the
provisions of the First Amendment other than the Religion Clauses."6 Free
speech and a free press are undoubtedly essential components of democratic
self-governance. But so are the freedoms of assembly, association, and petition.
All of these protected activities are distinct, though interrelated, forms of
citizen participation in government that work in tandem to make that
participation meaningful. Despite the biases of the modern Court and most
modern scholarship, free speech should not be given any precedence in this
relationship. Assembly, association, and petitioning are older forms of
participation, surviving from a predemocratic era, and they are no less
foundational to a functioning democracy. The scholarship discussed in this
Section has explored and explicated the implications of this insight for the
scope of the rights of association and assembly. We now turn to the
implications of this thought for the law of free speech.
81. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989); THOMAS 1.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7 (1966).
82. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
83. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
84. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20
(1971).
85. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121-65 (1993).
86. The relationship between the Religion Clauses and self-governance is beyond the scope of





At this point, we have come to recognize that the Speech, Press, Assembly,
and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment are independent provisions,
protecting distinct human activities but serving the common political and
structural goal of enabling meaningful self-governance by the sovereign
People. We have also come to realize that the Assembly Clause has been read,
and should be read, to protect not only ad hoc public assemblies of citizens but
also private assemblies and associations, including long-lasting and permanent
ones. Finally, we have seen that the modern tendency to give primacy to the
free speech right among these provisions, treating the others as primarily
designed to facilitate free speech, is both historically unjustifiable and logically
mistaken. If anything, the petition and assembly provisions have at least
historical, and to some extent practical, preeminence over the speech and press
provisions. But at a minimum they should stand on an equal footing. To
complete our understanding of the functioning of the First Amendment, one
final step is necessary: to recognize that while the various rights protected by
the First Amendment are distinct and independent, they are not unrelated. To
the contrary, the activities protected by the First Amendment can and generally
must be undertaken in tandem for them to be effective. Free speech is central to
a functioning system of popular sovereignty, but as the Supreme Court
recognized in NAACP v. Alabama, "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced
by group association, as [the] Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly."8 ' This is the insight underlying all of the Supreme Court's modern
association jurisprudence, from Alabama through Dale.
The modern Court's error has been to fail to recognize that these
relationships and dependencies are not limited to the connection between
speech and association and do not run in only one direction. For one thing, the
historical record clearly establishes that just as association facilitates speech, it
also facilitates petitioning the government, and indeed the link between
assembly and petitioning is historically much tighter than that between
assembly and speech. Underlying this blind spot in the Court's analysis is a
bigger problem: an impoverished view of what self-governance means. The
Court appears to envision self-governance as voting, pure and simple. Speech
enables self-governance by facilitating thoughtful and knowledgeable voting,
87. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Dc Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)).
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and association facilitates speech by permitting voices to be heard. But the
ultimate goal, and the core of self-governance, is voting. This perspective can
be traced to the seminal writings of Alexander Meiklejohn on free speech and
self-governance. Meiklejohn describes a New England town meeting as the
model of self-governance. The meeting is organized and moderated. Citizens
speak in a respectful, controlled way, addressing the topic at hand. If they are
disruptive or do not follow the rules set down, speakers can be silenced or
ejected. And, ultimately, those present vote. That, according to Meildejohn, "is
self-government. One important consequence of this model is that from
Meiklejohn's perspective, what is critical is that free speech educate listeners,
not that speakers be able to express themselves: "What is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."" As Jack
Balkin has recently pointed out, Meildejohn's vision has had enormous
influence on modern free speech theory.9 o
The difficulty with Meiklejohn's vision is that it is incomplete. The role of
the People in this vision is passive and therefore vulnerable-a concern that
Justice Brandeis certainly recognized, as reflected in his statement that "the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."" Voting and civilized
discussion among individuals are of course important elements of democratic
government, but they are hardly the sum total of the matter- especially in
times, such as the Framing era, when large numbers of citizens were excluded
from voting yet surely still were part of the sovereign People. For one thing,
Meiklejohn's vision of how democratic debate proceeds is curiously naive.
Actual political debate is not, and has never in this country's history been, so
polite. Instead, real political debate is often loud, robust, and nasty. Certainly
the most casual glance at cable news demonstrates the truth of that proposition
today. But this is not just a modern phenomenon. During the first Adams
Administration, harsh personal attacks were a standard part of politics, leading
the Administration to imprison, under the Sedition Act, Republican newspaper
editors responsible for such attacks. 92 Attacks on Abraham Lincoln were no less
88. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 24-25 (2d ed. 1960).
89. Id. at 26.
go. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 439-40 &
n.50 (2009); see also Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First Anendment,
34 CONN. L. REV. 405, 413-16 (2002) (summarizing Meildejohn's views on the relationship
between free speech and self-governance).
gi. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).




pointed,93 and so on. All of which is to say that the modern phenomenon of
attack politics has deep historical roots.
Even recognizing that political speech may be disruptive and uncivilized
does not go far enough. For one thing, it completely ignores the role of
petitioning in real democratic politics. For self-governance to have meaning,
citizens must not only be able to speak among themselves; they must also have
some access to public officials. In a recent article, Ronald Krotoszynski and
Clint Carpenter point out that petitioning historically has been an essential
part of citizen activism and that its modern decline has seriously injured our
democracy." Effective petitioning, however, is almost inevitably a group
activity. In a large republic, it is unlikely that individual citizens can make
themselves heard to those in power (except through litigation, which is a
special case). It is only when citizens combine around an issue, and make clear
that there are numbers on their side, that elected and other public officials take
notice. In other words, petitioning requires association. Moreover, while
petitioning historically was a carefully circumscribed and private process, akin
to modern lobbying, Krotoszynski and Carpenter convincingly argue that in
our modern democracy, public demonstrations and protests - that is, public
assemblies-must also be seen as a legitimate form of petitioning." In short,
association and assembly are essential components of any effective citizen
participation in the democratic process through petitioning.
Finally, the democratic value of citizens' associations is not limited to direct
participation in a public, political process. Citizens form their underlying
values, both political and personal (if it is possible to distinguish the two), in
the context of private associations.'" If popular sovereignty means anything, it
surely means that citizens must be able to decide what they believe and to
cooperate in that process of deciding, free from state coercion. Especially in an
age of widespread public education, however, citizens can do so only in
intimate associations, such as families, and in larger democratic associations.97
Notice that this function of associations has nothing necessarily to do with
public debate, the traditional concern of free speech, or with petitioning.
Rather, it is private conversation and joint activity that create these shared
93. See, e.g., DORIS KEARNs GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 257-58, 489 (2005); STONE, supra note 92, at 93-94, 109-110, 128-32.
94. Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 66.
g. Id. at 1308-09.
96. See WARREN, supra note 3, at 34-38; Shiffrin, supra note 72, at 840-41, 865-69.
97. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (distinguishing between intimate
associations, protected by substantive due process principles, and expressive associations,
protected by the First Amendment).
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values.'" In addition, as noted earlier, associations permit citizens to develop
the skills needed for participation in democratic self-governance. 99 Such skills,
again, are best developed independently of public officials, whose incentives on
the matter are decidedly mixed.
Public assembly and association free of state control, then, are essential
both to popular participation in government- self-governance in its active
form-and to underlying concepts of popular sovereignty. Given the
significance of assembly and association to the underlying structural purposes
of the First Amendment, it makes sense to read the First Amendment to protect
the process of forming and maintaining such associations. And finally, the key
insight is that free speech and a free press are important parts of that process.
In other words, just as association can facilitate speech, an important role of
speech is to facilitate assembly and association. It is hard to imagine how
assemblies or associations can be created without speech. At the most obvious
level, to organize a public assembly requires informing participants of the
planned assembly, publicizing it more broadly to attract others, and publicizing
the occurrence of the assembly after the fact, in order to influence the political
process (secret protests being an oxymoron). Assembly without free speech, in
other words, is impossible.
The role of free speech in enabling the formation and maintenance of
associations is more subtle but no less fundamental. An association is a coming
together of individuals for a common cause or based on common values or
goals. Associations do not form spontaneously. Individuals seeking to form an
association must be able to communicate their views and values to each other,
to identify their commonality. They must also be able to recruit strangers to
join with them, on the basis of common values. As Tocqueville points out, "In
a democracy an association cannot be powerful unless it is numerous."oo But
numbers cannot be achieved without publicity. Writing in the first part of the
nineteenth century, Tocqueville emphasized the role of newspapers in forming
and maintaining the common values and goals at the core of associations."o'
Today, the means of communication are broader, including not only the
written press but also mass mailings, media advertising, and of course the
Internet. But at the heart of the process are free speech and a free press. To
achieve the structural purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, one of the
primary objects of First Amendment doctrine must be to protect speech, the
98. See Shiffrin, supra note 72, at 865-66.
99. See Mazzone, supra note 3, at 697-701; supra note 72 and accompanying text.





function of which is to form and maintain associations and to communicate an
association's views to outsiders - what I denote as associational speech.
One last subject that must be considered is the nature of the assemblies and
associations that are provided strong First Amendment protection. Not all
associations contribute to the First Amendment's democratic goals, and so not
all associational speech linked to associations contributes to those goals either.
Justice O'Connor's separate opinions in the Roberts and New York State Club
Ass'n cases,o 2 in particular, drew a strong distinction between commercial and
noncommercial associations, arguing that the former do not deserve First
Amendment protections. The difficulty, however, is in defining precisely what
that distinction is. Justice O'Connor spoke of a difference between commercial
associations, which cannot claim a First Amendment right to control their
membership, and expressive associations, which can claim such a right."0 3 The
latter category, however, seems too narrow. It is rooted in the fallacy, discussed
above, that the sole First Amendment function of associations is to facilitate
speech. Justice O'Connor herself seemed to recognize this difficulty in Roberts,
when she defined the possible conduct of expressive associations to include "a
broad range of activities."' In particular, she wrote that "[elven the training
of outdoor survival skills or participation in community service might become
expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence,
patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement.""o She was quite correct to
define the protected conduct of noncommercial associations broadly, though
she was off the mark in describing that conduct as "expressive." The better
102. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
467 (20o8) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Roberts
for the proposition that the First Amendment does not protect commercial association).
103. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 19-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Predominately
commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a First Amendment associational or
expressive right to be free from the anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the [local]
law [at issue]."); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (noting that "there is only minimal constitutional protection of the
freedom of commercial association" and discussing the "dichotomy between rights of
commercial and rights of expressive association").
104. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
ios. Id. There is language in Justice Brennan's majority opinion that similarly blurs the line
between expressive associations and other noncommercial associations. See id. at 622
(majority opinion) ("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.").
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distinction is one drawn based on the primary goals of the association at issue.
Protected associations are those whose primary goals are relevant to the
democratic process. These include not only expression but also political
organization, value formation, and the cultivation of skills relevant to
participation in the democratic process.' Associations can contribute to self-
governance in any number of ways aside from direct advocacy, and all those
contributions deserve First Amendment protection. An environmental
organization such as the Sierra Club, for example, might run publicity
campaigns, lobby, and litigate, but it might also organize local clean-up days,
tree planting, and hikes. The latter activities are not themselves protected by
the First Amendment, but the existence and autonomy of an association directed
at such goals should be protected because of the value-forming function of
such activities, regardless of whether that association also engages in
expression or in the political process.'o' And speech directed at forming and
preserving such associations is similarly entitled to protection.
In contrast to the wide range of broadly democratic associations that
deserve First Amendment protection, certain associations whose primary goals
are immaterial to democracy do not. The most obvious are commercial
associations, including for-profit corporations and other commercial entities
such as limited and professional partnerships, whose primary goal is to make
money.os These associations are not outside the ambit of the First
106. For a more complete development of the relevance of associations to democratic skill-
building, see Mazzone, supra note 3, at 697-701.
107. This discussion also demonstrates why, like Justice O'Connor's distinction between
commercial and expressive associations, the Court's opinion in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986), does not fully capture the range of associations
protected by the First Amendment. In MCFL, the Court held that certain nonprofit
corporations may not constitutionally be subject to restrictions on corporate election
expenditures. In particular, it identified three necessary features of such an entity: (i) it was
"formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas" and not to engage in business
activities; (2) such a corporation has "no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to
have a claim on [its] assets or earnings"; and (3) it was "not established by a business
corporation or a labor union" and do not accept contributions from such entities. Id. at 264.
The difficulty with this definition of protected associations is that the first feature is far too
narrow. It limits protection to associations that are formed to promote political ideas, a
purely expressive goal. But as discussed in the text accompanying this footnote, democratic
associations contribute to self-governance in a plethora of ways aside from "promoting
political ideas," and many such associations were clearly not "formed for the express
purpose" of engaging in speech. The MCFL test would protect none of them. For a
discussion of other shortcomings of the MCFL standard, see infra note 215.
108. For a similar argument, distinguishing protected "social associations" from unprotected
commercial ones, see Shiffrin, supra note 72, at 865-66, 877. Shiffrin, however, does not




Amendment, at least from an associational perspective, because their activities
are irrelevant to democratic politics-the activities surely are relevant.
Corporations participate regularly in the political process (excessively, some
would say), and the workplace can be an important influence on the values of
individuals. Nonetheless, such participation and influence are not the primary
goals of commercial associations; they are either instrumental or coincidental.
For this reason, such associations are not the types of entities that the First
Amendment is intended to protect, even though some of their activities may be
entitled to constitutional protection on the basis of First Amendment principles
other than the associational perspective.o"
This understanding of the First Amendment, as protecting democratic
associations generally rather than only "expressive" associations, explains the
results in the "right to discriminate" association cases - notably Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale-far better than the convoluted opinions of the Court. The
Dale majority's reasoning, that the inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would interfere with the Boy Scouts' ability to express a message of hostility to
homosexuality, is unconvincing for two separate reasons (and is powerfully
refuted by Justice Stevens's dissent). First, it is not at all clear why Dale's mere
presence as an assistant leader would interfere with the Scouts' ability to
communicate a message of hostility to homosexuality, unless Dale himself used
his position as a bully pulpit to defend homosexuality, of which there was no
evidence in the record.' Second, the very idea that the Boy Scouts are a
primarily expressive association is a stretch. Of course, the Boy Scouts engage
in some expression, including reciting the pledge of allegiance and saying
prayers, but that is not the primary function of the organization. Rather, Boy
Scouts primarily do things like outdoor activities and community service.
These sorts of activities are not expressive as such, but they are still highly
relevant to the democratic process because they are driven by the Scouts'
broader goal of value formation. (Justice O'Connor's words in Roberts, sixteen
years before Dale, are prophetic in this regard."') The Boy Scouts thus
exemplify an association that is democratic, but not primarily expressive. If one
l0g. For this reason, the Court's opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), holding
that the First Amendment prohibits placing restrictions on the independent electoral
expenditures of corporations, including for-profit corporations, is not necessarily incorrect.
The breadth of the decision is not defensible on associational grounds, but it might be
justified based on other, purely speech-oriented principles. See infra notes 215-218 and
accompanying text.
iio. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 688-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
in. See supra note los and accompanying text (quoting Justice O'Connor's description of "the
training of outdoor survival skills" as protected, expressive activity).
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recognizes that such associations are protected by the First Amendment in their
composition and self-definition because they must enjoy autonomy from the
state, and thus have a constitutional right to select their own members, then
the result in Dale follows a fortiori."' Of course, this still leaves open the
question, raised in Justice Stevens's dissent, whether the Boy Scouts truly were
hostile to homosexuality."' It seems perilous, however, to grant government
officials (including judges) the power to determine the "true" values of
democratic associations. Putting such a powerful tool into the hands of the
state would threaten the autonomy of such associations.114 Of course, granting
such a high degree of autonomy to these kinds of associations imposes
significant costs on society in the form of exclusion and division, but given the
importance of associations to the structure of the First Amendment, those are
costs that the Constitution requires us to bear.
On the other hand, the distinction set forth above also makes clear that
commercial entities have no right to discriminate, either as employers or in
their choice of customers and contractual partners. Such associations are not
directed toward goals relevant to the democratic process, so their internal
organizations are not free from government regulation. There are, of course,
difficult intermediate cases, such as those in the Court's 198os trilogy. The
Court's implicit, and Justice O'Connor's explicit, conclusions that Rotary
Clubs and eating clubs fall on the commercial side of the line seem correct. The
Jaycees, on the other hand, pose a much more difficult problem, given that
they undoubtedly engage in substantial civic and political activities but also
and probably primarily (as Justice O'Connor points out in her concurring
opinion) in commercial activities."' On balance, given the lower court's
findings regarding the Jaycees' activities, the Court's conclusion is probably
defensible, but it is clearly a close case.
II. FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE THROUGH AN ASSOCIATIONAL LENS
The previous Part established the significant, mutually reinforcing
relationships between the various protections afforded by the First
n12. For a contrary argument that law should encourage internal dissent (of the sort represented
by Dale) within cultural associations, see Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV.
495, 555-58 (2001).
113. 530 U.S. at 684-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. For a similar argument, see Shiffrin, supra note 72, at 846-48.
ns. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and




Amendment, including the fact that one of the important roles of free speech is
to facilitate other types of political freedoms. In particular, it argued that one of
the functions of free speech law is to protect associational speech-speech the
purpose of which is to create and foster private, democratic associations or to
express the views of such associations to the world. Turning now from the
abstract to the specific, we will consider several areas of First Amendment
doctrine from the perspective of associational speech.
A. Dissident and Subversive Speech
In the modern era, free speech issues have been litigated in a huge and
varied range of areas, from pornography and nude dancing"' to tobacco
advertising'17 to campaign finance reform."' The roots of First Amendment
doctrine, however, lie not in these peripheral areas but in efforts by the
government to suppress what it considers to be dissident or subversive speech.
Most of the important free speech disputes during the first half-century of the
Court's free speech jurisprudence (from 1919 to 1969) arose in this area, and
most of the Court's important doctrinal innovations were also driven by such
cases. The cases encompass a number of distinct doctrinal strands, including
incitement, hostile audiences, and compelled speech. What they have in
common, though, is that in each of these areas the Court was faced with efforts
to suppress the speech of dissident groups. Viewing these cases as involving
associational speech therefore clarifies the constitutional values underlying
these disputes.
The earliest, most significant, and most contentious line of subversive
speech cases concerns incitement, which is speech that poses the risk of
encouraging listeners to engage in illegal action. The problem of incitement
first came to the Supreme Court in 1919, in a series of cases involving
prosecutions (under the Espionage Act of 1917) of opponents of U.S. entry into
World War I. In opinions by Justice Holmes, the Court unanimously affirmed
these convictions."' One of the cases, Schenck v. United States, announced the
"clear and present danger" test, under which subversive speech could be
suppressed if it produced a clear and present danger of social harm- in that
116. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entn't Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
117. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
118. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
1ng. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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case, resistance to conscription during wartime.' 2" In the months and years
following these first decisions, the Court upheld several other convictions
under the Espionage Act"' and also upheld convictions of members of the
Socialist and Communist parties for crimes such as criminal anarchy and
criminal syndicalism.12  These later cases were not, however, unanimous.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis wrote separately in all of them and, in the course
of doing so, enunciated a much stronger version of the clear and present
danger test than that of the majority, providing robust protection to free
speech rights. History has vindicated the Holmes-Brandeis position, and the
results in these cases (including Justice Holmes's early opinions) have been
almost unanimously condemned.2 3 By the 1930s, the Supreme Court began
moving toward the Holmes-Brandeis view, stepping up its protection of free
speech rights -notably in its 1931 decision in Stromberg v. California, striking
down a California statute that made it a crime to display a red flag as a symbol
of opposition to the government.
The adoption of the Holmes-Brandeis approach, however, did not make
the problem of incitement go away. Indeed, the problem returned anew with
the McCarthy-era persecution of Communists during the Cold War. Once
again, the Court at first stumbled, upholding numerous statutes imposing
restrictions on Communists. In 1951, for example, the Court affirmed the
convictions under the Smith Act of the leaders of the American Communist
Party while purporting to apply the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger
test.' By later in that decade, however, the Court's approach to incitement
i2o. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. Given that Holmes did not quote the "clear and present danger"
language of Schenck in the later Debs and Frohwerk decisions, it is not entirely clear whether
he truly intended to create a new "test" in Schenck. As related in the text, however, in later
cases Holmes, and eventually the Court, unambiguously adopted "clear and present danger"
as the relevant doctrinal test.
121. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
122. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
123. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (overruling Whitney);
id. at 451-54 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the Court's treatment of the majority
approach in the Red Scare-era cases); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-116 (1980) (criticizing the early cases); Vincent Blasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV 449, 508 (1985)
(describing the Red Scare era as "pathological" and observing the Court's failure "to stem
the tide of intolerance"). But see Bork, supra note 84, at 29-32 (defending the results in the
early incitement cases).
124. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).




became more nuanced. Notably, in two important decisions, the Court adopted
narrowing interpretations of the Smith Act to avoid First Amendment
concerns. First, the Court held in Yates v. United States that the Act condemned
not abstract advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government but only
advocacy directed at promoting unlawful actions.126 Then, the Court held in
Scales v. United States that the Smith Act criminalized not "passive"
membership in the Communist Party but only "active" membership.' The
final step in the development of the Court's incitement doctrine occurred in
1969, with Brandenburg v. Ohio."' The Brandenburg Court reversed the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for criminal syndicalism (overruling
Whitney v. California) and, in the course of doing so, abandoned the clear and
present danger test. 9 Henceforth, the Court held, advocacy could be
condemned as incitement only if it was "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action." 30 In
subsequent cases, the Court has made clear that this rule is speech-protective in
the extreme, requiring a high degree of both imminence and likelihood of
violence before speech can be punished, either criminally or with civil
liability.' The Brandenburg standard appears to have resolved the incitement
problem, largely in favor of protecting speech.
This abbreviated history of the incitement doctrine reveals a Court that
struggled for decades with the problem of incitement. That struggle is not
surprising. While inciting speech is often political in nature, it threatens
substantial social harms, whether interference with the war effort (in the
Espionage Act cases), a Communist revolution (during the McCarthy era), or
racial violence (in Brandenburg). Moreover, one may question why the
Constitution should protect speech advocating illegal activities, when the
126. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
127. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
128. 395 U.S. 444.
i29. Id. To be precise, the Brandenburg Court never explicitly abandoned the clear and present
danger test; it merely failed to mention that standard. However, this silence, combined with
the omission of "clear and present danger" from the Court's discussion of Dennis, seemed to
telegraph such a purpose. Id. at 447 n.2. That is certainly how Justice Black's concurring
opinion read the majority. Id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring); see also Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 863 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the abandonment of the clear and
present danger test in Brandenburg and other cases).
130. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
131. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105 (1973) (per curiam).
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activities themselves are surely unprotected.' It is no answer to point out that
such advocacy is often mixed up with legitimate criticisms of our society
because that does not answer why the advocacy aspect of the speech cannot be
punished. The Court has never resolved this conundrum.
One plausible answer, I submit, lies in the concept of associational speech.
What is notable about these important incitement cases is that all of them
involved speech in the context of public assemblies or political organizations.
Most of the cases involved multiple defendants acting jointly. Even in the case
of individual prosecutions (such as Whitney and Brandenburg), membership in
and assembly with disfavored organizations such as the Communist Labor
Party or the KKK lay at the core of the cases. The Espionage Act cases, for
example, all involved pleas by antiwar groups to join opposition to World War
I, and they often involved members of the Socialist Party. One of the early
defendants, Eugene Debs, was the national leader of the Socialist Party; his
conviction was based on a public speech that he had given.' Much of the
condemned speech and literature constituted efforts to recruit new members to
antiwar groups, including the Socialist Party. As Justice Brandeis commented
in one of the Espionage Act dissents, the criminalized act of "'distributing
literature' is a means commonly used by the Socialist Party to increase its
membership and otherwise to advance the cause it advocates." 3 4 Other cases, if
they did not involve explicit recruitment, involved discussions and activities
within a group or on behalf of a group aimed at forming agreements and
tightening ideological bonds within the group and disseminating the group's
messages to others, necessarily with a view to long-term recruitment. Examples
include the flag-waving in Stromberg, the pamphlets thrown into the streets in
Abrams, and the propaganda literature and workshops at issue in the Smith Act
cases. In other words, the incitement cases at their heart concern speech and
actions directed toward forming, expanding, and strengthening dissident
associations. Brandenburg itself involved a KKK rally, quintessentially a public
assembly, and post-Brandenburg incitement cases similarly involved either
public demonstrations (an antiwar rally in Hess'") or intragroup dynamics (the
organization of a boycott by a civil rights organization in Claiborne
Hardware"'). There is a broad modern consensus, as noted above, that the
132. Robert Bork famously made this argument in the course of attacking the Holmes-Brandeis
approach to incitement. Bork, supra note 84, at 29-32.
133. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
134. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. 414 U.S. 105.




speech in all of the incitement cases leading up to Brandenburg should have
been protected and that under the Brandenburg test it would have been
protected."' The reason, I would argue, is that even if the message
communicated by advocacy of illegality has little value to democratic self-
governance in isolation, dissident associations play a central role in a system of
genuine popular sovereignty, even when the goals of such associations are
abhorred by broader society (as the Communists' were in the 1920s and 1950s
and the KKK's are today). Such associations ensure that majoritarian
institutions, often with close ties to the state-such as the two main political
parties-do not gain a monopoly on the formation and dissemination of
political values. Dissident associations are also much more likely to become a
source for disruptive political activism such as protests and rallies - that is, for
an active citizenry -than are more majoritarian organizations. And, ultimately,
dissident associations are more likely to become centers for resistance to
tyrannical government actions than are broader, more diffuse organizations. As
the cases demonstrate, advocacy even of illegal action, short of incitement (as
defined in Brandenburg), plays an important role in the formation and
strengthening of such associations and so must be tolerated despite its
potentially harmful results.
The outcomes in two recent incitement cases in the lower courts bolster the
thesis that incitement has been granted such strong constitutional protection
because of its associational elements. In the first case, Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a publisher could be held civilly
liable to the survivors of murder victims who were killed by a hired attacker
who followed directions set forth in a book, published by the defendant, titled
Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors."' The court rejected a
First Amendment argument based on Brandenburg on the grounds that the
detailed instructions at issue were different from the abstract advocacy in
Brandenburg and earlier decisions."' In the second case, Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), the Ninth Circuit upheld, over a
powerful dissent, a RICO verdict in favor of a group of medical professionals
who provided abortion services against an antiabortion group that had posted
the names, addresses, and photographs of the plaintiffs on the Internet in the
form of "Wanted" posters and then crossed out the pictures of those doctors
who were assassinated.o4 Again, the Court rejected a First Amendment
137. See ELY, supra note 123, at 115 & 233 n.26.
138. 128 F. 3d 233 (4 th Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 255-65.
140. 290 F. 3d 1058 (9 th Cit. 2002) (en banc).
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defense, this time on the theory that the speech constituted an unprotected
"true threat."1 41
Leaving aside the doctrinal complexities of these two cases (the ACLA
majority's threat analysis is particularly problematic), on their faces these cases
appear to fall within the confines of Brandenburg. After all, both involved pure
speech advocating illegality, and yet in neither case could one plausibly argue
that the illegality was either imminent or likely when the book was published or
the information posted. In Paladin ten years passed between the publication of
the book and the murders, and in ACLA there was no evidence that the website
had ever generated actual violence. What, then, explains the results in these
cases? While many potential factors are at play, most significant is that neither
case involved associational speech. Hit Man was not written with the purpose
of recruiting others to a movement or organization; it was intended either as a
joke (as some think) or simply to assist strangers in committing crimes. Either
way, there was no associational element. ACLA is a somewhat more difficult
case because ACLA itself was a protected association, and most of its website,
including its generalized endorsement of violence, surely constituted protected,
associational speech designed to strengthen the organization and express its
views. The finding of liability in ACLA, however, was not based on those
aspects of ACLA's website but on the website's inclusion of personal details
about the doctors. Those details had no possible relationship to either
recruiting new members to the organization or disseminating the
organization's views. The sole purpose of that particular aspect of the website
seemed to be to encourage strangers to commit crimes; thus, it was not
associational speech. This fact clearly distinguishes ACLA from Brandenburg
because the speech at issue in Brandenburg, while containing some vague
references to violence,'14 was part of an organizational rally designed to deepen
associational bonds and had no real link to violence or the threat of violence
against others. Threats of violence and other speech closely associated with
violence by associations - as with speech associated with violence by
individuals - do not constitute protected speech any more than violence itself is
protected, because such speech is closely "brigaded with action.""14 In its 2003
decision in Virginia v. Black," the Supreme Court confirmed this distinction,
holding that burning a cross could be punished when it was done in order to
141. Id. at 1085-86.
142. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) ('We're not a revengent organization,
but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white,
Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken."').
143. Id. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring).




convey a threat to a third party but not when it was done as part of a KKK
organizational rally-that is, when it was associational speech.
Thus, because the specific speech punished in Paladin and ACLA did not
constitute associational speech, the results in those cases are consistent with
Brandenburg from an associational perspective. This is not to say that only
publications constituting associational speech deserve First Amendment
protection; that would radically narrow the scope of free speech. But in the
context of incitement, when serious social ills are threatened, such a limitation
might be justified because absent the advancement of associational values,
advocacy of illegal conduct simply may not be worthy of protection.
Limiting the protection of incitement to associational speech clarifies the
law in this area but does not solve all problems. In particular, the problem of
dissident or subversive organizations that do directly promote illegal activities
remains. As discussed above,'45 despite the value of associations to democracy,
not all associations can possibly be entitled to constitutional protection. In
particular, associations whose primary or direct goal is criminality cannot find
shelter under the First Amendment for the same reason that commercial
associations are unprotected141: criminal activity is not in itself a part of the
democratic process. Of course, breaking the law can sometimes be a part of a
political movement, but that is a different matter. Civil rights organizations
such as Dr. Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference
were entitled to First Amendment protection even though they engaged in
massive civil disobedience, but that is because the primary goal of such
organizations was not to break the law but to effectuate political and social
change. The Mafia, on the other hand, is an organization that surely is
unprotected, both because it is fundamentally commercial in nature and
because its goals are entirely criminal and therefore irrelevant to the democratic
process. Even an ideological organization whose primary activities are criminal,
such as the Red Brigades or Al Qaeda, deserves no protection; both
membership in and recruitment by such groups can be condemned.
Unfortunately, however, not all associations are easily classified. Many
organizations that are widely or officially labeled as criminal and terrorist, such
as the Palestinian group Hamas, the Kurdish PKK, and the (now-defunct)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also engage in peaceful, protected
activities. '4 Others, such as the Communist Party, have illegal goals but also
145. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
147. The latter two were chosen as examples because the Supreme Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of criminalizing the provision of "material support" to those groups, even
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engage in substantial protected activity, and the precise lines between the two
are not always clear (consider the example of a "political" strike pushed by
union officials associated with the party). Given these uncertainties, some
distinction must be drawn between protected associational speech that
nurtures a dissident organization and unprotected speech that supports an
association's illegal activities and thus can be suppressed for the same reasons
that the illegal activities themselves can be. The modern distinction between
abstract and directed advocacy, drawn in Yates and Brandenburg, appears to try
to capture this line. Note that abstract advocacy cannot be protected on the
theory that its abstract nature means it risks no social harm. After all, as
Holmes pointed out:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is
acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result.14
Abstract advocacy of the sort at issue in cases like Gitow,"'4 9 however, is an
essential aspect of recruitment, value formation, and the strengthening of
bonds within dissident associations. Criminalizing such advocacy would
necessarily lead to the evisceration of many dissident associations, which would
be a severe blow to democratic values. Direct advocacy of imminent action, on
the other hand, is much less directly connected to these values and is more
closely related to such clearly unprotected speech as criminal solicitation and
conspiracy, which have action and not association as their main aim and effect.
And for that reason, it is unprotected incitement.'
when the "support" consisted of speech in the form of training and coordinated advocacy.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
148. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
149. Gitlow was prosecuted for publishing the manifesto of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist
Party. Id. at 655 (majority opinion).
150. The recent Humanitarian Law Project decision might appear to weaken the line between
abstract and direct advocacy by permitting the government to impose criminal liability for
the provision of even nonviolent training to foreign terrorist organizations. However, that
holding is based on the perceived impossibility of separating support for the peaceful
activities of foreign terrorist organizations from support for their terrorist activities. See 130
S. Ct. at 2724-30. Furthermore, the Court specifically limited its holding to foreign
organizations, suggesting that domestic organizations may be entitled to greater protection.
Id. at 2730. This last limitation in particular reduces the significance of the Court's decision




In addition to incitement, another line of cases involving dissident speech
with a strong associational flavor is the line of "hostile audience" cases. The
leading case in this area is Cantwell v. Connecticut,'" in which the Court
reversed the conviction for breach of the peace of Jesse Cantwell, a Jehovah's
Witness. Cantwell was arrested for playing a record on a street corner
espousing the views of his faith; the record attacked all organized religion but
singled out Roman Catholicism in particular, eliciting a hostile reaction from
listeners. Drawing on the Holmes-Brandeis tradition, the Court held that
Cantwell could not be convicted unless a clear and present danger existed of
violence or other social harm and that the fact that Cantwell's speech offended
others was not a constitutionally permissible ground for punishment. Cantwell
appeared to establish a strong level of protection for speakers in the face of
hostile audiences. Eleven years later, however, the Court backed away from
Cantwell in Feiner v. New York,"s2 upholding the conviction of another public-
corner speaker, this time addressing civil rights issues, because the speaker was
stirring up a crowd and refused to obey police instructions to stop speaking.
On those facts, the Court found a clear and present danger, even absent
evidence of imminent violence that the police could not control. Feiner has
never been overruled, but later cases strongly suggest that the more protective
stance of Cantwell has won the day. In a series of cases involving civil rights
protestors, the Court consistently overturned convictions of marchers facing
hostile audiences, on the ground that the police could have prevented, and had
an obligation to prevent, any violence by the audience."' Today, those cases are
widely understood to reject Feiner's deferential approach and to impose an
effective requirement that law enforcement officers protect unpopular speakers
from hostile audiences and silence speakers only if controlling the crowd
becomes impossible. The Court has in fact extended this principle to the point
of holding that governments may not charge unpopular speakers for the cost of
protecting them (though nondiscriminatory charges applicable to all speakers
are permitted).
There are many solid reasons for protecting speakers from hostile
audiences, including the undesirability of permitting a "heckler's veto" of
speech. There is, however, something odd about the way in which these cases
are typically described. The image is of a lone, street-corner speaker (to use
151. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
152. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
153. Gregory v. City of Chi., 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
154. Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992).
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Owen Fiss's memorable phrase"'5 ) facing a hostile crowd and requiring
protection. What is odd, however, is that such a lone speaker, while perhaps
brave, is contributing nothing to First Amendment values if no one is listening.
Working up an angry mob is hardly conducive to self-governance. This
description of the hostile audience cases is, however, deeply incomplete. In
fact, all of the key cases involved not a truly lone speaker but rather
associational speech. In particular, they involved associational speech by
dissident organizations, seeking to express their views as a means of both
building solidarity and recruiting. In the civil rights cases, most obviously, the
speakers were organized marchers assembling in large groups (of thousands, in
one case)."' Such marches are classic forms of public assembly by political
associations and are therefore constitutionally protected regardless of any
speech element. The recent Forsyth County case involved another assembly by a
dissident group (in that case, white supremacists),"' and in Feiner itself, the
defendant was addressing a mixed-race crowd, some members of which were
clearly supportive of his views - again, a classic form of assembly."' Finally,
even though Cantwell was speaking together with only his two sons, he was
recruiting on behalf of a religious association, the Jehovah's Witnesses. 9 Seen
in this light, the Court's decisions in this area (excluding Feiner) seem
coherent. Dissident organizations invariably will face public hostility -that is
what makes them dissident-but, as we have discussed earlier, they play a
critical role in self-governance by challenging established understandings and
the predominance of the state. Without protection, however, such associations
often cannot engage in public organizational activities, recruiting, or public
assembly because of the threat of violence. In short, the hostile audience cases
are best understood as preventing not a heckler's veto against lone, unpopular
speakers, but societal vetoes of unpopular associations.
Indeed, the Court's protection of dissident, unpopular associations has
gone beyond merely providing protection from violence. On a few occasions,
the Court has recognized a constitutional right on the part of such associations
to obtain exemptions from generally applicable laws so as to be able to
maintain their organizational integrity and coherence. The leading Supreme
Court decision establishing a right of association, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
i55. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986).
i6. See sources cited supra note 153.
157. Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 137.
158. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316-17 (1951).




Patterson,"' recognized such an exemption. The holding in the case was that
Alabama could not require the NAACP to turn over a list of its in-state
members because public exposure would subject those members to harassment
and abuse."' Notably, however, the Court did not hold that states could never
require membership organizations to disclose their membership lists, only that
such a requirement could not be imposed on the NAACP in Alabama because
of the controversial nature of the NAACP's activities.16 2 Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Committee reached a similar result."' The question in
Brown was whether Ohio could require the Socialist Workers Party to disclose
to the public a list of contributors to the Party and recipients of its funds. The
Court held that it could not, in a manner consistent with the First Amendment,
even though the Court had earlier rejected a facial challenge to a federal statute
compelling disclosure of political contributors.,64 Again, the Court made clear
that it was not overruling its earlier decision and invalidating disclosure
requirements generally; it was only holding that such requirements could not
be applied to unpopular, dissident groups such as the Socialist Workers
Party."'s
At their heart, these are cases about dissident groups. This is true in the
obvious sense that the need for an exemption arises from membership in a
160. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
161. Id. at 462-63.
162. Id. at 460 (noting that the plaintiffs claims for immunity from disclosure were based on
"the facts and circumstances shown in the record"); id. at 463 (noting that disclosure may
still be required if the state's interest in obtaining the relevant information is strong
enough).
163. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
164. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-74 (1976).
165. Brown, 459 U.S. at 92-93. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), is another decision
recognizing a constitutionally mandated exemption for a dissident association, though in
that case on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause, not the Free Speech Clause. The question
in Yoder was whether a member of the Old Order Amish could be criminally punished for
refusing to send his children to school past the age of fourteen, in conformity with Amish
religious beliefs but in violation of state compulsory school attendance laws. Building on an
earlier case protecting the religiously based refusal of a Seventh Day Adventist to work on
Saturdays, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court reversed the conviction on
the ground that the Free Exercise Clause required the state to exempt the Amish from school
attendance, while reaffirming that school attendance laws are not generally unconstitutional.
Indeed, in Yoder the Court went one step further than in Sherbert or the cases discussed in
the text, clarifying that the exemption was required because Yoder's actions were the result
of the religious beliefs of "an organized group," 406 U.S. at 216, and not just the beliefs of
an individual. But in more recent cases, notably Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), the Court has failed to follow Yoder in protecting the religious practices and beliefs
of religious associations, thereby rejecting the parallel between free exercise and free speech.
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dissident group. But more broadly, the existence of the group seems a
necessary precondition for a claim of exemption. It is very difficult to imagine
that an individual would ever succeed in claiming an exemption from neutral,
generally applicable, and otherwise constitutional laws based on that
individual's unusual ideological beliefs."' But when a First Amendment
exemption is requested on the basis of membership in an unpopular or
unconventional group, as the cases discussed here show, the Court has been
more responsive. Why the distinction? The answer must lie in the special
constitutional value of associations and the protections accorded to them under
the First Amendment. Protecting dissident and unconventional associations is
a sufficiently strong constitutional value that it trumps the general
presumption, present throughout First Amendment law, that neutral and
generally applicable regulations of conduct are not subject to serious First
Amendment scrutiny.'"' The exemption cases, in other words, rest upon the
same underlying principles as the general protection for associational speech.
B. The Government as Manager- Public Forums and Government Employees
Another area of free speech law with a strong associational character is the
public forum doctrine. The public forum doctrine sets forth the constitutional
rules for government regulation of speech on its own property. When the
government is regulating speech in either traditional public forums (such as
streets and parks) or designated forums (property that the government has
intentionally opened up for speech), it may neither ban speech outright nor
burden speech based on its content, without showing that the burden "is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end." 6" Even content-neutral "time, place, and manner"
regulations of speech in public forums must ensure that alternative avenues for
speech exist.,'6 In nonpublic forums or limited public forums, however, the
government enjoys much broader discretion to regulate speech.' The case law
in this area is bewildering, in particular on the question of what sorts of
166. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (rejecting a
Free Exercise claim of exemption from generally applicable regulations of conduct).
167. See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
168. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.




property qualify as public forums,"' but the key underlying principle is that, at
least with respect to certain sorts of government property, the government's
ability to restrict speech is severely limited.
The difficult question raised by the public forum doctrine is why this
should be so. Why, when the government is acting in a proprietary capacity as
opposed to a sovereign regulatory capacity, should it not enjoy precisely the
same rights as other property owners to ban speech on its property? This was
the traditional view,17 ' and even today the Court is quite deferential when
government employees' speech is restricted by the government in its capacity
as an employer."17 So why not when it acts as an owner? The answer that a
plurality of the Supreme Court (speaking through Justice Owen Roberts) gave
in the Court's leading case on the public forum doctrine was a historical one:
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions."" The difficulty with this explanation is that
while Justice Roberts's description of the use of the public forum is accurate, it
fails to explain why this tradition creates a constitutional principle, especially in
light of the fact that the traditional legal view on the question was to the
contrary. The answer, I submit, can be found in the concept of associational
speech.
The rhetoric of the public forum doctrine, like most of free speech law,
focuses on individual speakers and their rights. To quote Owen Fiss: "[T]he
Free Speech Tradition can be understood as a protection of the street-corner
speaker. An individual mounts a soapbox on a corner in some large city, starts
to criticize governmental policy, and then is arrested for breach of the peace. "175
Such a vision, however, is odd. As noted above, such lone speakers contribute
little to self-governance or other First Amendment values. Moreover, it is not
clear that individual speakers really need the public forum to speak or that the
public forum is the most effective way for individuals to reach an audience
(especially in the age of the Internet). In fact, however, many if not most public
forum cases have not involved individuals seeking access to government
properties; they have involved groups wanting to use government property to
assemble, to recruit, and to send a collective message to the public or to
171. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
172. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895) (Holmes, J.), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
173. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (20o6).
174. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
17S. Fiss, supra note 155, at 1408.
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government officials. The leading case, Hague v. CIO, involved efforts by labor
organizations to assemble and distribute literature on the streets of Atlantic
City, New Jersey."' Significant modern public forum disputes have involved
Nazis marching in a suburb with a large Jewish population, 17 Hare Krishnas
seeking to solicit funds and recruit members," political protestors at the 2004
Democratic National Convention,"' and, most frequently, abortion
protestors."o
Simply put, this makes sense. While individual speakers may find use of
the public forum desirable, access to the public forum is essential for
associations and public assemblies. After all, where if not in the public forum
can public assembly occur? In short, the crucial rights at issue in the public
forum cases are not simply speech rights but rights to assembly, association,
and associational speech.
Indeed, if one examines the actual use of the public forum for First
Amendment purposes, speech as such is almost peripheral. In the typical
modern protest or assembly utilizing the public forum, speeches are no doubt
made and signs are waved, but they are hardly the main point of the exercise.
After all, most of the speeches are inaudible and the signs often illegible. The
point, rather, is the assembly itself. The fact of a large public gathering forms a
sense of solidarity, helps to influence public opinion, and sends a message to
political officials. Assembly, in short, is a form of petition and a form of
associational speech, quite aside from what is said during the assembly. And it
is assembly, not the actions of a street-corner speaker, that is at the heart of the
public forum doctrine.
An appreciation of the fact that access to the public forum is primarily a
concern of groups rather than individuals has important implications for some
aspects of the doctrine. For one thing, it makes clear that a meaningful public
forum must be a large, open, and publicly accessible space or else the purposes
of the doctrine cannot be fulfilled. Furthermore, given the close ties between
public assembly and petitioning the government, alternative spaces must
176. Hague, 307 U.S. at 501-03.
177. Vill. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
178. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
17g. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Bos., 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
i8o. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S.





provide access to government officials. 81 On this view, the severely restricted
"demonstration zone" approved by the First Circuit as a designated site for
protests outside the 2004 Democratic National Convention cannot possibly
qualify as a true public forum.' Another lesson is that when assessing whether
content-neutral restrictions on speech in the public forum do leave open ample
alternatives, courts should ask not only whether alternative opportunities to
speak exist but also whether alternative opportunities to gather in groups,
sometimes large groups, are available. Speech substitutes are not necessarily
assembly substitutes. Finally, courts should be highly suspicious of rules that
restrict particular groups' access to the public forum. Even if such restrictions
are not written expressly in terms of the content of disfavored groups' speech,
they pose a grave risk that the government is seeking to suppress disfavored
associations and assemblies. Awareness of assembly and associational concerns
can convert the public forum doctrine into a much more robust protector of all
First Amendment liberties, not just speech.
There is some value in contrasting the public forum doctrine with the
Court's treatment of the speech of government employees. The public forum
doctrine continues to place substantial limits on the government's power to
limit speech on its property. Recently, however, the Supreme Court held in
Garcetti v. Ceballos that the First Amendment places no limits on the
government's power to restrict the speech of its employees during the course of
their employment."' What explains the very different approaches? After all,
both situations involve the government acting in a proprietary rather than a
sovereign capacity, and surely there is no reason to believe that the speech of
government employees is less valuable than the speech of protestors. There are
many factors at work here, including in part the government's greater
managerial needs as an employer than as an owner, but perhaps part of the
answer lies in the fact that when a government employee speaks in the course
of her employment, her speech has no associational aspect. The speech is
uttered as a part of her job and on behalf of her employer, not as a part of
forming, strengthening, or representing a private association.
Even on the rare occasions when a government employee's speech does
have associational implications -for example, when the employee is organizing
community volunteers or when a whistleblower's revelations trigger political
activity by private associations -the employee's speech is not itself truly
associational. In the first instance, government-sponsored community groups
181. For a similar argument, see Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 66, at 1311-13.
182. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 10.
183. 547 U.S. 410 (2oo6).
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are not the sorts of associations at the heart of the First Amendment's
protections and goals. Such groups, which are necessarily under heavy state
influence, cannot play the kind of independent role in self-governance-
including in forming values free of state interference and in overseeing and
petitioning public officials-that the First Amendment envisions. And while
whistleblowers' revelations can trigger associational activities and speech -just
as the publication of scientific discoveries or the disclosure of financial crimes
can-that does not make the revelations themselves associational speech. After
all, associational activities can be triggered just as easily by events, such as oil
spills or international confrontations, and those events do not implicate the
First Amendment. In short, while speech by government employees in the
course of their employment might well have social value, particularly in
keeping citizens informed about their government's activities, it is not
associational speech and does not play the sort of central role in the process of
self-governance that private, associational speech does. This fact, combined
with the government's strong managerial interest in controlling such speech,
appears to explain the holding of Garcetti.84
C. Charitable Solicitation
Another area of First Amendment doctrine in which the theory of
associational speech has important implications is the regulation of charitable
solicitations. In a series of cases, the modern Court has extended broad, almost
unconditional First Amendment protection to the activities of nonprofit
organizations in distributing literature and soliciting funds. It has struck down
a requirement that door-to-door canvassers obtain permits;"s a law regulating
the fees that professional fundraisers may charge for soliciting on behalf of
charities;s' a law forbidding charities, in connection with fundraising, from
paying expenses of more than twenty-five percent of funds raised;'"' and a
statute forbidding door-to-door solicitation by charities that do not spend
more than seventy-five percent of funds raised for "charitable purposes.""" On
184. This is not to say that the Court's conclusion in Garcetti was necessarily correct. While not
associational, government employees' speech, especially whistleblower speech, does have a
role to play in self-governance and was therefore arguably undervalued in Garcetti. My point
is simply that such speech is less central to the structure of the First Amendment than
associational speech is.
i8. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
186. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
187. Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).




the other hand, the Court has accorded substantially less protection to
advertising and solicitation by commercial entities. 8, Yet both forms of speech
at heart have the same content -a request for money. Why does the Court
impart such high First Amendment value to charitable solicitations? The
answer must lie in principles of associational speech.
From an individualistic perspective, the extraordinary protection that the
Court has accorded charitable solicitation seems a bit odd. It is not at all clear
how speech asking for money contributes to democratic discourse.190 From an
associational perspective, however, the value of such speech is clear. The ability
to solicit funds and supporters is the lifeblood of associations. Without
solicitation, nonprofit associations would be limited to activities that their
current members can fund, which would necessarily be limited. Charitable
solicitations permit associations to organize themselves, to expand, and to fund
political activism and petitioning. Protection of solicitation is thus an essential
aspect of the Constitution's general protection for private associations and
assemblies. Charitable solicitation is valuable not for its speech aspects but for
its associational aspects. Viewed as associational speech, charitable solicitation
is quite properly treated not as marginal but as at the core of the protections
accorded by the First Amendment. Put differently, the reason why charitable
solicitation receives strong constitutional protection is not that the solicitation
itself has great value but that it enables charitable associations to engage in
other activities that are central to self-governance and so to the purposes of the
First Amendment. 91
i89. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(holding that commercial speech may be regulated or silenced so long as the relevant law
satisfies a reduced, intermediate level of scrutiny); see also Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1989) (confirming that commercial speech receives
reduced constitutional protection).
190. 1 speak here only of charitable solicitations. Distribution of literature and other speech is of
course highly relevant to democratic discourse and therefore obviously deserving of
protection.
191. The associational perspective also helps to explain why commercial solicitation receives much
more limited First Amendment protection than does charitable solicitation, even though at
heart both forms of speech are simply requests for money. See supra note 189 and
accompanying text. Commercial entities, as discussed earlier, see supra notes 108-109 and
accompanying text, have far weaker associational rights than do noncommercial entities,
because their primary function-profit-making -has no direct connection to self-
governance. Just as commercial associations have weaker (or no) associational rights to
discriminate in selecting their members, so also the associational speech of commercial
entities receives limited constitutional protection. This is because solicitation and
advertising of commercial transactions by commercial entities are not directed to other
goals, as charitable solicitations are; they are themselves the central profit-making activities
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D. Campaign Finance Reform and Corporate Speech
Finally, we will consider what insights the associational speech perspective
can provide to an important and recently controversial area of First
Amendment law: campaign finance reform. The body of the Supreme Court's
case law in this area, from its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo" to its most
recent pronouncement in Citizens United v. FEC,'93 is complex and impossible
to treat fully in this space. Nonetheless, because of the significance of this area
of law and because associational speech issues lie at the heart of many of the
disputes here, some discussion is in order. We will focus on two foundational
questions: the distinction that the Court has drawn between campaign
contributions and expenditures, and the Court's treatment of campaign
expenditures by corporations and unions. 94
We begin with the distinction between contributions and expenditures, a
distinction that the Court created in its seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo.
The primary issue in Buckley was whether statutory restrictions on the amount
of money that individuals could contribute to political candidates, and on the
amount that individuals could independently spend "relative to a clearly
identified candidate" in a federal election, were constitutional.'95 The majority
distinguished sharply between contribution limits and expenditure limits,
upholding the former and striking down the latter. With respect to
contributions, the Court held that while contribution limits do interfere with
the rights of individuals to associate with the candidate of their choice, the
interference was justified by the government's strong interest in combating
corruption and the appearance of corruption."' With respect to expenditures,
toward which such entities are directed. As such, commercial solicitation does not advance
principles of self-governance.
192. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
193. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
194. I do not separately discuss the Court's election law jurisprudence concerning the regulation
of political parties, including the early White Primary cases, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932),
and more recent decisions invalidating various restrictions on how political parties organize
their primary elections, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Eu v. S.F.
Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479
U.S. 208 (1986). These cases raise difficult and interesting questions regarding the tension
between political parties' associational rights and the government's legitimate power, or
obligation, to regulate elections, but they do not directly raise questions of associational
speech and so are not relevant to the subject of this paper.
195. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).




on the other hand, the Court held that the heavy burden placed on freedom of
expression by limits on expenditures outweighed any governmental interest in
regulating expenditures. Expenditure limits were therefore unconstitutional. 1 7
The result reached by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo was, and remains,
highly controversial. Chief Justice Burger dissented from the Court's decision
to uphold contribution limits,'9" while Justice White wrote a sharp dissent
criticizing the majority's view that expenditure limits raise serious First
Amendment concerns.' 99 In recent years, several Justices have similarly
questioned Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures,
generally advocating greater suspicion of contribution limits.2 oo How does the
theory of associational speech illuminate this debate? First, the associational
speech principle strongly confirms (contrary to Justice White's Buckley dissent)
that contributions to political candidates deserve significant First Amendment
protection because they constitute a form of association. Giving money to
another person is not, of course, always an act of association. But when
individuals pool their financial resources to achieve political ends, doing so is
surely a core form of association. In the case of most political contributions, the
resultant associations are large and relatively anonymous (in the literature,
these are called "tertiary" associationso'), but they are nonetheless protected
associations. Moreover, in the context of local elections, contributions may be
an important aspect of close, personal associations at the core of the democratic
process. This insight in turn suggests that contribution limits should be subject
to fairly stringent constitutional scrutiny and that excessively strict limits
should be invalidated, as the Court has recently confirmed.20 2
The question that the associational speech perspective cannot answer,
however, is whether the First Amendment permits any contribution limits, if
the government interests supporting such limits are strong enough. No
constitutional rights are absolute, and the question of how to reconcile the
197. Id. at 44-51.
198. Id. at 242-46 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. Id. at 257-66 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 266-69 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Scalia, J.); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431, 466-82 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia
and Kennedy, JJ.) (criticizing restrictions on expenditures by political parties in
coordination with a candidate, which the majority treats as equivalent to contributions).
201. WARREN, supra note 3, at 39-40.
202. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2oo6) (striking down stringent contribution limits
imposed by Vermont in its state elections).
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government's legitimate need to limit public corruption with the First
Amendment's protections for association is beyond the scope of this Article.
With respect to expenditure limits, an associational perspective leads to the
surprising conclusion that whatever the legitimacy of governmental restrictions
on expenditures by individuals, restrictions on expenditures by groups are
highly suspect.2 o3 When associations express the joint views of their members,
they are engaging in conduct that stands at the intersection of the assembly,
association, petition, and speech provisions of the First Amendment. Such
conduct is at the core of self-governance as seen through an associational lens,
and it must presumptively be free of interference by the government.
Moreover, the fact that expenditure limits literally restrict not speech but
money cannot answer this argument because, in the context of associations,
expenditures are intrinsically linked to the joint expressive and other
democratic activities of the group. After all, pooling financial resources is one
of the core functions of associations. The Buckley Court was thus correct to
view such restrictions, at least as applied to groups, suspiciously. Justice
Stevens's recent argument to the contrary-that limits on expenditures
constitute only indirect and therefore permissible limits on First Amendment
freedoms2o4-is incorrect because it fails to consider the impact of spending
limits on associations. With respect to restrictions on independent
expenditures by individuals, however, associational speech theory has little to
say. This is not to say that other First Amendment principles may not limit the
government's power in this regard, but associational speech concerns are by
definition not implicated in the absence of an association.
Once one recognizes and accepts the stringent protections accorded by the
First Amendment to expenditures and expression by groups, a critical question
arises: which groups are entitled to this protection? This question was at the
core of the Supreme Court's recent, highly publicized, and controversial
decision in Citizens United."os Before turning to Citizens United, however, a brief
discussion of two earlier Supreme Court decisions regarding corporate speech
is in order. In First National Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti, the Court was faced with
a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that forbade corporations from making
contributions or expenditures in relation to referendum elections, unless the
election involved issues that "materially affect[ed] ... the property, business or
203. The Buckley Court noted the severe impact of expenditure limits on the ability of
associations to express themselves. 424 U.S. at 22-23.
204. Randall, 548 U.S. at 276-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




assets of the corporation."o' The Court struck down the statute, holding that
it restricted speech at the core of the First Amendment and that the corporate
form of the speakers being regulated was irrelevant.207 Twelve years later,
however, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce veered away
from its holding in Bellotti.20s In Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan statute
that forbade corporations from making independent expenditures in support
of, or in opposition to, candidates for election to state offices. (Corporations
were permitted to create segregated funds for such purposes.20 9) The Court
acknowledged that, under its precedent, such a restriction severely impaired
First Amendment liberties and was therefore subject to stringent scrutiny. But
it concluded that Michigan's compelling interest in preventing corporate
money from dominating the electoral process justified the law.2"o
This takes us to Citizens United. In Citizens United, the Court faced a
challenge to § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, a federal
law that prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury
funds to make "electioneering communications" -speech within a brief period
before an election that was either express advocacy for or against a specified
candidate for federal office or its functional equivalent.' In McConnell v. FEC,
the Court had upheld this provision, relying on Austin.1 In Citizens United, a
majority of the Court overruled Austin and this aspect of McConnell, striking
down § 203. The Court held that the speech suppressed by § 203 was at the
core of the First Amendment's protections and that (following Bellotti) the
corporate identity of the speaker was irrelevant for First Amendment purposes.
Can associational speech theory contribute to this debate?
Yes, it can contribute powerfully. The key question raised by Citizens
United is one of corporate "rights": whether the corporate identity of a speaker
should influence the scope of First Amendment protections. The majority said
that it should not, while the dissent argued to the contrary that corporations
206- 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. at 776, 784.
208. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
2og. Id. at 655.
210. Id. at 658-60.
2w. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 5 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 4 4 1b (20o6)); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889-90 (2010);
see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007) (concluding that
constitutional considerations precluded the application of § 203 to any speech except express
advocacy or speech "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate").
212. 540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003).
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lack full First Amendment rights. From an associational speech perspective,
both sides asked the wrong question and therefore arrived at profoundly
incorrect answers. The key issue is not the corporate form of the speaker but
what kind of collective entity-that is to say, association-the speaker is. If the
speaker is a form of association protected by the First Amendment, because it is
an association that contributes to self-governance, then the association's speech
explicating its views constitutes associational speech, entitled to the highest
level of constitutional protection. The corporate form may be relevant to this
question, but it cannot be decisive; surely some corporations constitute
democratic associations at the core of the First Amendment's protections.
Thus, the dissent's assertion that the speech of corporations can be flatly
restricted seems clearly incorrect. Indeed, the associational speech perspective
suggests that, contrary to the majority's assumption, sometimes such speech is
entitled to more protection than individual speech because such associational
speech contributes more directly to the core self-governance goals of the First
Amendment. But a clarification is necessary here. As discussed in detail
earlier,"' not all associations fall within the protection of the First Amendment.
Only associations whose primary goals are relevant to self-governance fall
within this category. Associations that do not fall within this category, such as
those whose primary goals are commercial or criminal, do not enjoy the same
level of constitutional solicitude for their speech. From this perspective, the
result reached by the Court in Citizens United is clearly correct on the facts of
the case. Citizens United was a nonprofit corporation whose primary goal was
to organize individuals who shared its (conservative) political views and to
express those views. 1 It was quintessentially the sort of disruptive, democratic
association that is at the heart of the First Amendment's protections for speech,
association, and petitioning. The particular speech at issue in the litigation was
a film, entitled Hillary: The Movie, that was highly critical of then-Senator
Hillary Clinton, a candidate for the presidency. This movie was
quintessentially associational speech relevant to self-governance. That Citizens
United chose to organize itself in a corporate form, and to accept small
amounts of contributions from for-profit corporations, cannot change the fact
that in its structure, goals, and functions, it was a democratic association whose
activities and speech furthered self-governance and thus merited protection."'
213. See supra notes 102-109, 145-147 and accompanying text.
214. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886-87; CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/
about.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
215. It should be noted that despite the obviously democratic character of the Citizens United
organization, the Court concluded that the group did not fall within the category of
associations granted constitutional protection under the MCFL test, see supra note 107,
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Recognizing that the Court decided Citizens United correctly on its facts
does not end difficulties here, however, because the majority's holding
extended constitutional protection to political speech by all corporations, not
just those like Citizens United. Indeed, the majority specifically refused to
adopt a narrow approach limited to nonprofit corporations."' In that respect,
the majority's decision is probably unjustified, at least from an associational
speech perspective. Most for-profit corporations have the primary goal of
making profits, a goal with no relevance to self-governance. These are not the
sorts of associations protected by the First Amendment, and their speech is not
associational speech for First Amendment purposes. I do not mean to suggest
that the line between for-profit and nonprofit corporations (as the Court drew
it in Massachusetts Citizens for Life'"7) is necessarily decisive here. There may be
some technically for-profit corporations that are in practice primarily directed
to goals of self-governance, just as there may be nonprofits whose goals are
completely tangential to self-governance. The key here is not technical, legal
classifications but rather a careful examination of facts. It is fair to say,
however, that the vast majority of for-profit corporations - especially large,
publicly held corporations -have primarily commercial goals, such that their
speech is not associational speech. Given that, the majority in Citizens United
was wrong to equate the speech of such corporations to the speech of groups
like Citizens United itself. This is not to say that there may not be other,
nonassociational principles that support extending First Amendment
protections to political speech by commercially oriented corporations. That
question is beyond the scope of this Article. But from an associational
perspective, the holding in Citizens United is clearly overbroad because it grants
protection to associations whose functions and goals are unrelated to the
structural purposes of the First Amendment.
because Citizens United accepted a small amount of donations from nonprofit corporations.
130 S. Ct. at 891. This suggests another flaw in the MCFL test, aside from its excessive focus
on expressive associations. See supra note 107. After all, why should a legitimately
democratic association lose constitutional protection merely because it accepts some financial
support from unprotected associations? There may well be room to exclude from protection
associations that are merely faiades for commercial interests, but if that is the goal of the
MCFL test, then the solution is surely overbroad; it provides a bright-line rule at the
expense of the genuine associational rights of such organizations as Citizens United.
216. The Court rejected on statutory grounds the Solicitor General's invitation to limit the
holding to nonprofit corporations "funded overwhelmingly by individuals," through a slight
modification of the MCFL test. 130 S. Ct. at 891-96.
217. See supra note 107.
zi8. The statute at issue in Citizens United regulates speech by both corporations and labor
unions, though the Court did not discuss labor unions separately. Labor unions are a tough,
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In conclusion, analyzing free speech as linked with and sometimes
subsidiary to the rights of association and assembly helps to clarify some
important areas of First Amendment doctrine. The question to which we now
turn is whether the perspective of associational speech sheds light on more
basic questions regarding free speech.
III.ASSOCIATION AND SPEECH-BROADER LESSONS
This Article has so far explored the relationship between the First
Amendment right of free speech and the other provisions of the First
Amendment, including the right of association. It has also explored the
implications of that relationship for free speech doctrine. I close with some
preliminary thoughts about what this Article's holistic approach to the First
Amendment teaches us about more basic questions such as the nature of
speech. I also consider some limitations of associational speech as a theory of
the First Amendment.
The concept of associational speech is a lens through which the Free
Speech, Assembly, and Petition Clauses can be read together, as connected and
mutually reinforcing. The theory of associational speech views speech as a
fundamentally collective, communal activity. Associational speech is about
joining together, whether for a brief exchange of thoughts or for a more
sustained period (in the form of associations and assemblies). Associational
speech is not an atomistic, individual act. Yet because of the liberal,
individualistic perspective that contemporary society brings to the
Constitution, speech is generally viewed in highly individualistic terms. Such a
vision of speech is most obvious in the various "self-fulfillment" theories of free
speech,"' but it is also more pervasive. Generally, theorists focus on the
autonomous actions of the speaker, though occasionally the listener takes
center stage.22 o But either way, speech is treated as the act of an individual
in-between case because while arguably their goals are primarily economic, as with for-
profit corporations, historically the union movement has had a strong political aspect to it,
which suggests that protection is justified. On balance, I am inclined to the view that from
an associational perspective, the political activities of unions-like those of commercial
associations -are not entitled to First Amendment protection because such activities are
incidental to unions' economic goals. See supra Section II.D. I admit, however, that the
question is a close one. In addition, as with commercial associations, I leave open the
possibility that there are nonassociational reasons why the political activities of unions should
receive First Amendment protection.
219. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57




acting alone. Of course, some speech today does fit this model-soapbox
speakers in London's Hyde Park come to mind-but this perspective ignores
the collective nature of most communication by speech. Speech generally
involves multiple participants. Put differently, speech is not usually about self-
expression; it is about bonding, associating, and attempting to find
commonality.
Not all speech involves seeking cultural or political commonality of the sort
fundamental to self-governance. Negotiating a contract is speech, but it is
speech seeking a commercial agreement and therefore receives less
constitutional protection. Furthermore, not all speech (as we understand it
today) involves immediate, face-to-face association. The written word can join
readers separated by vast distances and centuries. Broadcasting similarly
involves fairly anonymous interactions, as do most electronic communications
via the Internet (though not, significantly, e-mail). Such speech is not
associational in the same sense as the speech discussed in this Article.
Reconciling such speech to a theory of associational speech raises some
complex questions.
One possible path to clarity here may be to distinguish between speech and
publication. Speech, in this view, is communication to an audience from whom
a response of some sort is expected. Often that response is an associational one.
Publication, on the other hand, is one-way communication to an anonymous
audience."' Telephone conversations, text messages, personal correspondence,
and e-mail seem to fall within the category of speech, while large metropolitan
newspapers, broadcast and cable television, websites, and blogs fall more in the
category of publication. These latter activities do seem less associational than
the former.
Nonetheless, an associational element often exists even in communications
by publication. After all, even most publications are directed not at completely
unknown, perhaps future audiences but at relatively identifiable contemporary
speak); John Greenman, On Communication, 1o6 MICH. L. REv. 1337 (2008) (defining
communication as requiring an act of free will on the part of a listener).
221. This distinction might be traced to the differences between the Speech and Press Clauses of
the First Amendment, on the view that, given the technology available in the Framing era,
speech was necessarily a face-to-face affair, while the Press Clause protected printing and
publication. I do not insist upon this reading, however, and do not wish to embroil myself
in the ongoing debate over whether the Press Clause creates special protections for the
institutional media. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905-o6, and id. at 928 n.6 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (rejecting the view that the Press Clause provides special protections to the
institutional press), with id. at 951-52 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
institutional press does enjoy special protections under the Press Clause), and Potter
Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) (same).
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audiences. Such publications in fact do advance important associational
interests. When Martin Luther (allegedly) nailed his ninety-five theses to the
door of the church in Wittenberg in 1517, he was in a sense "publishing" the
theses, but the purpose and effect of his actions were of course to draw
adherents to him in religious association-an associational effect that was
magnified by the circulation of printed copies of his theses throughout
Germany. Similarly, Tocqueville recognized the importance of newspapers in
preserving and strengthening associations in early America.m' And in the
modern world, publications such as newsletters, organizational websites, mass
e-mails, tweets, and Facebook pages play a central role in the formation and
maintenance of associations, especially larger, national associations. Such
tertiary associations,"' while perhaps not as significant to value formation as
more personalized associations, have a central role to play in self-governance by
mobilizing large numbers of like-minded citizens independently of the
government. Examples range from the NRA to the Sierra Club to the Tea Party
movement to President Obama's political group, Organizing for America. Such
associations could not exist, and certainly could not thrive, without
publications, and from Tocqueville's time and before one of the primary roles
of publications has been to foster such associations.
This Article does not contend, however, that all publications - or for that
matter all speech-can be explained in associational terms. Communications by
the mass media seem truly anonymous and do not fit easily within
associational theory. Similarly, books directed at distant audiences, scientific
publications, and many other types of speech and publication have goals that
are distantly or not at all directed at association. Associational speech does not
purport to be a universal theory of the First Amendment. It cannot explain all
free speech and press doctrine, nor does it encompass all of the purposes and
goals of the First Amendment. The more limited purpose of this Article is to
highlight some of the relationships and interactions among different provisions
of the First Amendment and to consider how an awareness of those
relationships can inform certain areas of free speech law.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been modest. The Article has not tried to
present a grand unified theory of the First Amendment or a lens through which
all First Amendment doctrine can be analyzed. Instead, it has explored
222. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 71, at 518-20.




relationships among the Free Speech, Assembly, and Petition Clauses of the
First Amendment, as well as the right of free association recognized by the
courts as implicitly protected by the Amendment, and the ways in which these
relationships provide one perspective from which to understand the role of the
First Amendment.
The Article has focused in particular on the relationship between free
speech and association. Modern law tends to treat the associational right as
subsidiary to free speech and tends to assume that the primary purpose of
association is to facilitate speech. I have argued that this approach is ahistorical
and incorrect. In fact, the speech and association rights, as well as the assembly
and petition rights, have a primary, common goal: to enable self-governance.
These rights do not exist in isolation but support and interact with each other.
Association derives from assembly, assembly facilitates petitioning, and speech
is closely tied to all of these activities. In this sense, then, the First Amendment
does not create distinct rights; it protects a complex set of interrelated human
activities that are central to the process of self-governance. The special focus of
this Article has been the relationship between speech and association. In
particular, I have argued that one of the critical roles of free speech is to
facilitate association. In other words, speech is often subsidiary to association,
rather than the converse. This is the theory of associational speech. The bulk of
this Article has explored the role of associational speech and elucidated how
understanding the role of free speech in associational terms can clarify many
puzzling areas of First Amendment doctrine. Finally, the Article has identified
and addressed some of the limits of associational speech as a theory of the First
Amendment.
Recognizing the significance of associational principles in interpreting and
understanding the First Amendment opens up many important areas of
investigation, building upon the start made in this Article. One particularly
fruitful avenue of investigation might be to explore the relationship between
associational principles and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The
First Amendment, after all, begins with the prohibition against "law[s]
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,"" and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses provide special
and powerful protection for religious activities. The reasons for providing such
protection are manifold, based in history and experience, but perhaps
associational principles can provide some insight here. In a recent article, Paul
Fricke argues that the Free Exercise Clause should be read to protect primarily
the activities of religious groups, not individuals -what he calls the
224. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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"associational thesis."2 2 Other scholars have also in recent years been exploring
the institutional aspects of the Religion Clauses.2' This scholarship resonates
in obvious ways with the broader thesis of this Article. Future scholarship may
wish to explore the ways in which First Amendment protection of religious
institutions - that is, religious associations - relates to self-governance.2 That
religious associations play an important role in self-governance seems clear.
After all, religious groups contribute critically to value formation and provide a
setting for joint deliberation for vast numbers of citizens. They may focus
primarily on religious rather than overtly political questions, but no clear line
can be drawn between religion and politics in this area. In addition, religious
groups have been important participants in the democratic process itself.22"
Indeed, it would be safe to say that American politics would be unrecognizable
without the active participation of overtly religious associations. The Religion
Clauses, by protecting the autonomy of religious associations,"' may thus
contribute to the First Amendment's overarching goal of protecting and
enabling the process of self-governance.
225. Paul C. Fricke, The Associational Thesis: A New Logic for Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 53 How.
L.J. 133 (2009).
226. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of
the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. 273 (20o8); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions: OfSovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009).
227. I have explored this question to some extent in BHAGWAT, supra note 78, at 121-24
(discussing the role of religious institutions in self-governance).
228. For example, religious leaders such as Elijah Parsons Lovejoy played an important role in the
antebellum Abolitionist movement. See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Eliah
Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges
of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1109 (1997). In the twentieth century, religious
leaders and groups were central players in the temperance movement, see RICHARD F.
HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE,
AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 36-37 (1995); ROBERT A. HOHNER, PROHIBITION AND
POLITICS: THE LIFE OF JAMES CANNON, JR. 72-73 (1999); THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING
DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA, 1800-1933, at 114-15 (1998); the civil
rights movement (in which the black church and church leaders such as the Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr., were primary leaders), see generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963 (1988); and the rise of the religious right
in the 1980s, see generally WILLIAM C. MARTIN, WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE: THE RISE OF THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN AMERICA chs. 7-10 (2005). More recently, religious groups such as the
Mormon and Catholic Churches have played important roles in the debate over same-sex
marriage. See, e.g., Matthai Kuruvila, To Pass Measure, Catholics and Mormons Allied, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. lo, 2oo8, at Ai.
229. For a summary of judicial decisions protecting church autonomy, see Horwitz, supra note
226, at 116-20.
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